Originally apperared at fsksrb.ru translated by Stevo Marjanović exclusively for SouthFront
Drama (at the same time, the genre is comedy and tragedy) about projected Montenegrin membership in NATO is interpreted usually simplified to the usual political or, more precisely, politicized manner. Mostly it is very narrowly, without considering the wider geostrategic implications (and opportunities), entirely from the perspective of relations of that country with the Alliance and vice versa. As if we are talking about equal contenders in the least.
In addition, eye catches that in the past few years media campaign for membership has reached an unprecedented intensity. Something like that has not been recorded in the past with any candidate, when the ranks of the Euro-Atlantic family admitted a number of European countries of the former Eastern Bloc.
Recent events in the Montenegrin Parliament, where a majority of votes adopted a resolution to support the accession of country in NATO, as well as frequent public statements of Montenegrin officials as well as important world leaders and bureaucrats, then, maintaining a number of Euro-Atlantic meetings (seminars, workshops, round tables, conferences, Adriatic-Ionian, and other “initiatives”, the activity of pro-Western NGOs, etc.), as well as intense media coverage of the Montenegrin regime and Euro-Atlantic office, confirm everything mentioned above.
Something Euro-fanatical Serbia (and its “deliver units,” which are leading it to destruction) for now can only dream and hope.
However, it remains incomplete and unclear, which is why the global rulers of the world so much (and in this way) care, that a small, economically and especially militarily weak and unrecognizable Montenegro, which now officially distanced itself not only of Russia as an century old ally but also from this crushed Serbia, have a shortened procedure (if possible without a referendum) to become a full-fledged member of NATO, when at this stage its perennial status as a so-called “Membership Action Plan – MAP” is quite acceptable, as a last step before joining (significantly more than the IPAP status that Serbia got) and complete orientation towards the West?
What are the real reasons that the Montenegrin state, evidently much ahead of schedule, take “an equal” place in the Euro-Atlantic political-military family? What’s with the hurry of the aggressive NATO dragons in the case of Montenegro?
Is it to accelerate the process of further and permanent removal of Montenegro from Serbia and Russia, as well as breaking the Orthodoxy with synchronized and simultaneous attacks on Serbian Orthodox Church through the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and Littoral?
Of course. But for that it is not necessary to storm towards its accession to NATO. Such goals require time, perseverance and patience. And that, quite simply, is going with steady flow which cannot be significantly accelerated. Pinning the country into joining NATO, like how it seems, can only be (and already is) counterproductive.
Is it the economic (economic, financial) and other similar reasons?
Hardly. The Montenegrin economy and finance, including in it even criminogenic – smuggling and drug flows, are negligible on a global map of the world. And that which works is, anyway, under the complete control of a globalist elite who manages NATO.
Does NATO requires military “force” and effectives of Montenegro and whether it will have significant influence on increasing the combat readiness of the Alliance?
Even less. In addition to small groups (platoons – up to a few tens of soldiers) of Montenegrin Army shift symbolically personal involvement in the so-called missions (peace and combat) at some points of the world. Such as the mission “Resolute Support” in Afghanistan or engagement of Montenegrin individual officers in the command ship of the Italian Navy “Carabinieri” in maritime operation of EU (NATO) named NAVFOR “Atalanta”.
Montenegro after the “reform” according to NATO standards and procedures, has only some 1,500 professional soldiers, who are divided into three types of Army – Land Army, Air Force and Navy. The armed “force” that cannot, even if they wanted to defend, say, the city of Kolašin in the event of a major snowfall. No satire intended.
In her organization, the Army of Montenegro formally has one brigade of the Army, of which currently is active only one infantry battalion of gang composition. In addition, it has access to: Military Police Company, Engineering Company, a company of connections, intelligence and reconnaissance troop, logistical battalion, training center and an honor guard unit. It does not have tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery significant resources and long-range missile technology.
Air force consist of little combat helicopter in little squadron (e.g. no fighter planes) and several defensive Navy ships in the territorial sea, don’t deserve greater attention.
In addition, Montenegro does not have an organized war army (combat units) or there are any plans in this direction. It practically extinguished the “mobilization” as a fundamental “element of combat readiness,” without any replenishment in peace or in war, and that means there is no real army or defense.
The people who, historically, heroically fought for freedom, honor and dignity, which for centuries was the brightest example for a large part of humanity, remained not only without the army and the defense system, but without any possibility of defense against potential aggressors and hypothetical predicament. As is, for example, the actual migration of the Arab world. Better to say orchestrated, violent migrations, which will doom all of us in the coming period, without exception.
Thus, from the mentioned above it is clear that this country, at the moment when it seceded from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), namely, when she left the fraternal embrace of Serbia by declaring independence after well organized (by the West) and executed scam called “referendum”, locked itself in the Euro-Atlantic community, so that with “its own” will officially fell to their sphere of influence – political, economic, security, military.
It automatically meant turning its back on the Russian Federation, although this fact was skillfully disguised for several years in domestic but also in the Serbian and the Russian public. However, the pushing of Montenegro by the orders of the western rulers, first in the case of recognition of an independent “Kosovo” (which was a knife, not in the back, but in the chest of Serbia and the whole Serbian nation), and then the introduction of economic and other sanctions against Russia with the same cliché, things are expelled into the open and, finally, a bitter pills are swallowed.
Well, then what’s with this hurry and sort of onslaught that Montenegrins (and everyone else not a small number and percentage) in the hills, mountains and coast, are pushed into NATO and to reach the “golden” heights of Euro-Atlantic “joy” and “prosperity”, when the situation is apparently under perfect control?
The answer lies in the “Geo-military estimation of Yugoslavian battlefields,” the official military document – a doctrine that, after several decades of painstaking scientific work was completed and agreed upon in the mid 90-ies of the last century. It is, as such, unknown to the general public. Although it was, after the democratic revolution, after turning (and subjugation) of the former common state to the Western alliance, formally placed “ad acta,” and so it could be available in its entirety.
Because there is no former state, there is no military secret under the label “secret”. But there are practices and geography cannot be changed in books nor on the ground.
Based on this extraordinary military-scientific studies obtained by a teamwork of countless military experts and experienced military personnel, and on the basis that, among other things, the organization conceived the Yugoslav Army as well as the entire defense system of the former state, and that he had NATO (un)officially acknowledged and incorporated into their strategies and doctrines (which means that on this background bases its performance to this day but during the armed aggression of 1999 failed at the same test), it may be fully understood in every corner of their strategists viewed the territory of Montenegro (just like territory of Serbia) and that these are real (primarily military, war) reasons and fears, which they are forced to the splitting of the territory (state) and placing it under complete, primarily military influence, continue with full intensity and without stopping.
Western fears of Russia (and even from such a broken and conquered Serbia) in a future global (or regional) conflict, and this conflict is quite in sight, and in this regard is Montenegro sucked into events and significant influence, and a possibility of reversal of political and security orientation of the country (from Russia) and geo-strategic redirection in the near future, say in the elections, never stopped, nor will it happen.
What it means?
For example, virtually only one airborne division of the Russian army (or 2-3 air Airborne Brigades), transferred to the highlands of the former Yugoslav republics as part of a possible assault in the depth of the enemy (and that enemy is NATO), or one aircraft carrier (or another multipurpose warship to escort or, better yet, a nuclear submarine) anchored in its territorial sea (like the Russian forces now have in the water and on the territory of Syria, such as the base of Tartus), would modify not only geopolitical flows, but would force NATO to significantly deviate from this part of the Balkans and amending aggressive, conquering plans.
And it would literally mean not only the loss of important geostrategic point, because Montenegro with its access to the Adriatic Sea that is because of Otranto strait and the so-called marine gravity towards the Gulf of Trieste and the shores of Italy and Albania, but completely recomposing of NATO doctrine and strategy in terms of eventual conquest and possession of territory and local waters.
According to the plans and estimates, which certainly have not (or could be) changed, it would mean that the Western military alliance in a possible conflict in the said area with the above, a powerful opponent (which would certainly be supported by a great number of local residents) , if it lost the initial initiative and wished success, had to engage forces equivalent of two to three land armies – one from the direction of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one from the territory of Albania, as well as a strong fleet of naval forces from Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea, which is under the control of Italy and the Allied Joint Command (“South Wing”) of NATO in Naples – Allied Joint Force Command Naples.
Do NATO strategists think about this, if such a hypothetical scenario is present and whether they are burdened with these possible developments?
Certainly. Because, after all, this is why NATO exists. They will not be lulling themselves that “work” is finished until they pull Montenegro into their ranks and conquer it with founding (and repeatedly amended) document under the official title “North Atlantic Treaty”, in which special importance have Articles 4 and 5. Only under such guarantees and under such formal requirements they can afford more or less restful sleep and relaxation.
It is likely that will critics contest the above mentioned positions. And just because of that, let’s see briefly what the military doctrine and (warrior) experience say, and what parameters have to be taken into account in connection with the case of Montenegro.
The former Yugoslav unique battlefield consisted of three theaters of operations: North, Southeast and Southwest. Accordingly, the Yugoslav Army is and was organized into three continental armies, whose border areas of responsibility coincide with the boundaries of geospace of the mentioned military regions.
Southwest theater of operations included the unique territory of Montenegro and the Raška region (which is especially important for us in Serbia, and that’s another reason why it is necessary to “break” Montenegro) area of approximately 20,000 square kilometers, with over 900 thousand inhabitants.
Geospace of this military region is represented by mountainous terrain with few passable traffic zones that link the valleys of rivers Moravice Uvac, Ćehotina, Tara, Piva and Zeta and Skadar valley. A general feature of the valley is in canyon and gorge-like appearance, where are quality communications vulnerable to demolition and suitable for blocking. Battlefront is very limited, and the actions of armored and mechanized forces narrowly channeled in the grip of passable roads and over mountain passes, and cannot take a strong leadership role in combat operations, or the tempo of offensive operations. The hill and mountain formations, as well as the use of smaller airborne, especially helicopter forces come to the full extent.
South of the main watershed mobility is more limited because of the karst topography. Conditions for the organization of defense on several successive lines, for the concentration of material reserves for defense and taking active and offensives toward specific, temporary-possessed parts of the battlefield are extremely favorable. Relief, area covered with forest and climatic conditions in the area of battle restrict the use, development and maneuver of the attacker forces and airstrikes become maximally complex, with negligible effects.
Geospace of Southwestern military region was (and still is) divided into (1) Eastern relief unit (between rivers Ibar and Lim) and (2) Western relief unit which covers the largest part of geospace of Montenegro to the valley of the river Lim presented with subalpine and high mountain land. The conditions for its combat attackers are extremely unfavorable, so the traffic directions can be successfully closed with small forces.
In this geographic space, Western relief of the whole, significant airborne rooms of Zeta valley with Cemovsko field. Mountain and hill compositions are holders of combat operations, especially precipitous. Conditions for the conduct of the defense in depth and distribution of material reserves are very favorable. Among these, there are two sides of combat actions: first, Pobijenik-Crni Vrh-Lisa-Bjelasica-Komovi and, second, Ljubišnja-Durmitor-Vojnik-Maganik-Žijovo. They can be successfully defend with fewer forces.
In relation to the relief conditions, covered with forest and climatic conditions south-west theater of operations was (and probably will be so in the near future) a real fortress on ex-Yugoslav battlefield. Compact mountainous terrain unfavorable to offensive actions of the aggressor, providing favorable conditions for various effective actions of defenders at many consecutive spots.
The special significance of this military region is closing the entrance into the military region of the Adriatic Sea, because all directions lead over Skadar and Zeta valley. For this reason, appropriate and necessary development and economising of forces – combat units, small units can close and defend it.
Southwest theater of operations relies on the waters of the Adriatic to the limits of territorial waters and the coastal strip. This area is characterized by: wordy, unfavorable shape (width about 110 km), shallow depth of 35 km in the mainland and sensitivity to cutting along the shorter axis. Characteristics of karst terrain in the hinterland largely complements the mentioned above. The effects from the local waters are channeled at the folds of the mountains: Rumija (Sutorman) between Lovćen (Seoštrik)and Rumija, then, Lovcen (Čekanje) and Orjen (Ledenice), so the creation of a broader, operational bridgehead by an attacker is extremely unfavorable.
Of course, the length of the text does not allow for a detailed assessment of the geostrategic importance of southwestern battlefield, and it is a great pity, because the geostrategic picture would be understandable as well as potential defensive angle. It would take tens of pages to analyze in detail and show, among other things, the following key geostrategic (strategic, operational and tactical) concepts, such as:
– strategic object: the wider area of Podgorica-Nikšić;
– strategic direction of actions: Montenegro-Raška;
– operating regions: 1. Pljevlja-Bijelo Polje-Prijepolje-Priboj and 2. Berane-Gusinje-Čakor-Rožaje;
– operational airborne rooms: Zeta valley;
– operating line: coastal independent tactical direction;
– operating line: Montenegrin direction.
Do NATO “minds” in Mons and Naples handle these informations and assessments in such detail?
Of course. And even more thorough and studious.
Now, that’s the main reason (and dilemma) from the beginning of the text, for which they want (and need) to embrace Montenegro in its “warm” arms as soon as possible.
If they cannot control Serbia, which has not yet lost enough of its identity and been territorially torn apart enough, and at this time is still too big to chew.
Once we had distributed on the territory of Montenegro (including Raška region) the legendary 2nd Army, which consisted of two corps: Podgorica and Užice, with immediate subordinate, a number of army units.
Territorial Sea and coast was defended by the Navy with a strength matching the Fleet, which was later reorganized in.
After the NATO’s so-called military reforms in Montenegro and in Serbia, a number of brigades, regiments, battalions, flotillas, maritime centers have been swept away… peacetime and wartime combat units who have endured every possible temptation. The most important exam, has been passed in 1999. When NATO did not dare, nor knew how to approach not just the Montenegrin mountains and valleys, but even the coast and territorial waters of the Adriatic.
Sixteen years later, what do we and they have?
A big nothing. And we don’t know how to proceed.
What do we have for consolation and hope (albeit in vain)?
To sing that well-known, old song – “…it has been told, it has been told, that the Russians are coming…”